

## Remuneration guidelines for senior executives

These remuneration guidelines include the CEO and other senior executives. The guidelines are forward-looking, i.e. they are applicable to remuneration agreed, and amendments to remuneration already agreed, after adoption of the guidelines by the Annual General Meeting 2026. These guidelines do not apply to any remuneration decided or approved by the general meeting.

### *The guidelines' promotion of the company's business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability*

SSAB's business strategy aims to establish the company as an industry leader in terms of both profitability and sustainability among comparable companies. SSAB's stated objective is to be the safest steel company in the world to work in, and shall in addition adhere to high environmental standards and be a responsible partner to all stakeholders. A more detailed description of the business strategy can be found on the company's website.

A successful implementation of the company's business strategy and safeguarding of the company's long-term interests require that the company can recruit and retain qualified employees. For this, the company must be able to offer competitive remuneration in the labor market on which the executive operates. These guidelines are intended to offer senior executives a competitive total remuneration, which in turn promotes the company's business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability.

### *Types of remuneration, etc.*

The remuneration shall be on market terms and may consist of the following components: fixed cash salary, variable cash remuneration consisting of a short-term variable component ("STI") and a long-term variable component ("LTI"), pension benefits and other benefits. Additionally, the general meeting may – irrespective of these guidelines – resolve on other remuneration or incentive programs, including share-related or share price-related remuneration.

STI remuneration shall be linked to predetermined and measurable criteria to be measured over a period of one year. The criteria shall be designed to contribute to the company's business strategy and long-term interests, including sustainability. STI remuneration may amount to not more than 100 per cent of the fixed annual cash salary.

LTI remuneration shall be share related or share price related and shall thereby be approved by the general meeting. The objectives of LTI shall be to create a common interest for the company management and the shareholders to drive the business towards long-term good return on the SSAB shares and to promote the company's ability to recruit and retain key employees.

For the CEO and other senior executives pension benefits shall be contribution-based except as otherwise provided in the rules of a general pension plan (e.g. the Swedish ITP2 plan).

The retirement age should be set individually, however, in no case earlier than the age of 65. In the event the employment terminates prior to the retirement age, the executive shall receive a paid-up policy for earned pension.

Variable cash remuneration shall not qualify for pension benefits, except in those cases where so provided in the rules of a general pension plan. The pension premiums shall amount to not more than 50 per cent of the annual pensionable salary.

Other benefits may include, for example, health insurance, medical insurance and company cars. Premiums and other costs relating to such benefits may amount to not more than 10 per cent of the fixed annual cash salary.

Remuneration under employment subject to other rules than Swedish may be duly adjusted to comply with mandatory rules or established local practice, taking into account, to the extent possible, the overall purpose of these guidelines.

## *Termination of employment*

Upon termination of an employment, the notice period may not exceed twelve months. Fixed salary during the period of notice and severance pay may together not exceed an amount equivalent to the fixed salary for 24 months for the CEO and 18 months for the other senior executives. The period of notice may not exceed six months without any right to severance pay when termination is made by the executive.

For senior executives outside Sweden, the termination period and severance pay may deviate from the above stated due to legislation or local market practice.

## *Criteria for variable cash remuneration, etc.*

The criteria for STI are set annually and shall consist of Group objectives, of unit objectives (i.e. objectives related to a particular division, a certain subsidiary or a certain function) and/or of individual objectives, with distribution as follows.

Group objectives may be financial and non-financial. The financial objectives shall comprise at least 60 per cent of the Group objectives and shall be linked to EBITDA margins in relation to a comparison group of the company's competitors, own EBITDA level or margin, return on capital employed, net profit, the company's cash flow, the company's stock turnover or similar. The non-financial group objectives shall be linked to sustainability.

The unit objectives may be different for different units. For units with clear profit responsibility, the unit objectives shall to at least 50 per cent consist of financial objectives that shall be linked to sales, volumes, operating profit, operating margins, cost savings, return on capital employed, cash flows or similar. The remaining part of the unit objectives shall consist of operational objectives linked to the unit's strategic plan. For other units, the unit objectives shall be designed so that they clearly contribute to the fulfillment of the respective unit's strategy.

Individual objectives may be quantitative or qualitative aimed at increased value creation for the company.

For the CEO, STI shall to at least 70 per cent consist of Group objectives and to the remaining part of individual objectives. For senior executives with clear own profit responsibility, STI shall to at least 45 per cent consist of unit objectives and to the remaining part of Group objectives or individual objectives. For other senior executives, STI shall to at least 70 per cent consist of Group objectives and to the remaining part of individual objectives.

The variable cash compensation programs shall be structured such that the Board of Directors has the possibility, should exceptional circumstances prevail, to limit the payment of variable cash compensations, or to decline to make such payment, where such a measure is deemed reasonable and compatible with the company's responsibilities to its shareholders, employees and other stakeholders.

The company shall have the possibility, under applicable law or contractual provisions, subject to the restrictions that may apply under law or contract, to in whole or in part reclaim variable cash remuneration paid on incorrect or improper grounds (claw-back).

To what extent the objectives for variable cash remuneration have been satisfied shall be evaluated when the measurement period has ended. Following a proposal from the Remuneration Committee,

the Board of Directors is responsible for the evaluation so far as it concerns variable remuneration to the CEO. For variable cash remuneration to other senior executives, the Remuneration Committee is responsible for the evaluation in consultation with the CEO. When the Board of Directors assesses how the financial objectives have been met, this should be done against the latest published financial information with any adjustments that the Board of Directors considers necessary or appropriate.

Before the payment of variable cash compensation is effected, the Board of Directors must verify that the objectives linked to the remuneration have been met and that the remuneration has been calculated correctly.

### *Salary and employment conditions for employees*

In the preparation of the Board of Directors' proposal for these remuneration guidelines, salary and employment conditions for employees of the company have been taken into account by including information on the employees' total income, the components of the remuneration and increase and growth rate over time, in the Board of Directors' and the Remuneration Committee's basis of decision when evaluating whether the guidelines and the limitations set out herein are reasonable.

### *The decision-making process to determine, review and implement the guidelines*

The Board of Directors has established a Remuneration Committee. The committee's tasks include preparing the Board of Directors' decision to propose guidelines for executive remuneration. The Remuneration Committee shall also monitor and evaluate programs for variable remuneration for the executive management, the application of these remuneration guidelines as well as the current remuneration structures and compensation levels in the company. The CEO and other senior executives do not participate in the Board of Directors' or the Remuneration Committee's processing of and resolutions regarding remuneration-related matters in so far as they are affected by such matters.

The Board of Directors shall prepare a proposal for new guidelines at least every fourth year and submit it to the general meeting for its adoption. The guidelines shall be in force until new guidelines are adopted by the general meeting.

### *Derogation from the guidelines*

The Board of Directors may temporarily resolve to derogate from the guidelines, in whole or in part, if in a specific case there is special cause for the derogation and the derogation is motivated to serve the company's long-term interests, including its sustainability, or to ensure the company's financial viability. As set out above, the Remuneration Committee's tasks include preparing the Board of Directors' resolutions in remuneration-related matters, including also the preparation of resolutions to derogate from the guidelines.

### *Description of significant changes to the guidelines and how the views of shareholders' have been taken into consideration*

Four years have passed since the previous remuneration guidelines for senior executives were adopted by the general meeting, which is why the Board of Directors and Remuneration Committee have reviewed the guidelines which have resulted in the following proposed changes. The ceiling for STI remuneration in relation to the fixed annual cash salary has been raised from not more than 75 percent for the CEO and not more than 50 percent for other senior executives to 100 percent for both the CEO and other senior executives. The retirement age floor has been raised from 62 to 65 years. Minor adjustments have been made to the STI criteria, allowing senior executives other than the CEO to have a part of the STI based on individual objectives. Furthermore, the floor for the proportion of the CEO's STI objectives that shall consist of Group objectives has been lowered from 85 percent to 70



percent to allow for a larger proportion of individual targets. Finally, it has been clarified that the company shall have the possibility, under applicable law or contractual provisions, to in whole or in part reclaim variable cash remuneration paid on incorrect or improper grounds. In addition to what has been mentioned above, only minor editorial changes have been made compared to previous guidelines. No comments have been received on the guidelines from any shareholder.